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CAN LAWYERS STAY IN THE DRIVER’S SEAT? 
 
Daniel Currell and M. Todd Henderson* 
 
The law firm business is thriving, despite signifi-
cant pain in the legal sector as changes take place.  The 
continuing success of Big Law is in part because of its 
ability to adjust quickly to changes in demand by hiring 
and firing staff.  But as Larry Ribstein saw, big changes 
nevertheless loom on the horizon.  These changes will 
likely be driven by a series of specialized service pro-
viders who compete with law firms from a lower price 
point as Benjamin Barton points out in his article in this 
volume.  If history is a guide, cheaper alternatives will 
evolve into higher-quality alternatives, at which point 
the law firms most invested in the status quo are likely 
to suffer greatly.  While the significance of this disrup-
tion is often viewed in terms of how it will affect law-
yers, in fact it should be assessed mainly from the per-
spective of consumers and society: does the quality of 
legal services rise or fall at any given price point? 
While this is the correct question from a social 
standpoint, a related question of immediate interest to 
lawyers is this: will lawyers still be “in the driver’s 
seat” of the legal sector when the dust settles?  Or will 
they cede their leadership in the way that architects 
ceded leadership in the construction sector?  Architects 
were once clearly at the top of the food chain in the 
building sector, but that is no longer the case.  Develop-
ers and general contractors have a great deal more 
power and, it must be said, make far more money.  Will 
traditional law firms cede control of major legal projects 
in the same way? 
This is a radical question – but we believe it is not 
frivolous.  Lawyers don’t generally have sophisticated 
                                                 
* Executive Director, Legal, Risk & Compliance Practice, CEB, 
Inc.; Professor of Law and Aaron Director Teaching Scholar, Uni-
versity of Chicago Law School, respectively. 
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procurement, project management and commercial 
skills.  These skills are important for managing complex 
legal matters, and there is a large and growing class of 
non-traditional legal service providers who are cultivat-
ing those skills.  It could turn out to be more efficient for 
traditional law firms to focus on what they do best, 
which is far less than the work of managing every as-
pect of  a legal matter – just as the work of an architect 
is much less than managing an entire building project.  
Architects supply a key intellectual input to a building 
project.  By the same token, law firms could end up 
supplying a key intellectual input to a legal matter. 
As Bill Henderson points out in his article in this 
volume, there are cultural and practical barriers to law 
firms – as currently structured – changing their model to 
adapt to the market.  At a minimum, the traditional law 
firm model faces stiff competition in the decades to 
come.  More radically, law firms may find themselves 
sidelined from some of the most important aspects of 
legal representations. 
Yet if law firms cede their traditional leadership 
role, effects on their clients and society will not neces-
sarily be positive overall.  Because of this, we believe it 
is important to consider the implications of these chang-
es on the education, licensing, and regulation of law-
yers. The traditional law firm’s ability to avoid the fate 
of other commoditized professionals will depend in part 
on how lawyers approach the content of their education, 
the design of their licensure system, and the regulation 
of their industry. 
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“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age 
of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, 
it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was 
the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the win-
ter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before 
us, we were all going direct to heaven, we were all going direct the 
other way . . ..”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
If you read the papers or any number of legal ar-
ticles from the past few years, you’d think lawyers are 
in crisis. (Note, we didn’t say “clients” or “society”; this 
is an important point to which we will return.) Larry 
Ribstein, whom we’ve come to honor in the way he 
would want, by taking him on, wrote three or four pa-
pers, plus a book on the subject.2 His scholarship is 
just a fraction of the ink spilled in the past few years on 
the issues of the business model of law firms, legal ed-
ucation, and licensing. The economics of the legal pro-
fession has become a cottage industry among law pro-
fessors, as has the coverage of law schools and failing 
law firms. The media has jumped on the bandwagon 
too. There was, for instance, enormous coverage of the 
recent failure of the law firm Dewey & LeBoeuf, one of 
the country’s most respected firms.3 The New York 
Times also ran several large, marquee stories on legal 
education, including a rather negative piece on the New 
York Law School.4  
But is this really an existential moment for the 
legal profession? In an interview with the New York 
Times on the Dewey collapse, lawyer Michael Trotter, 
                                                 
1 Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities. 
2 See, Larry E. Ribstein, “The Death of Big Law,” 2010 WISC. L. REV. 749 (2010); Larry E. 
Ribstein, “Practicing Theory: Legal Education for the Twenty-First Century,” 96 IOWA L. REV.  1649 
(2011); Larry E. Ribstein, “Lawyers As Lawmakers,” 69 MO. L. REV. 299 (2004); LARRY RIBSTEIN & 
ERIN O’HARA, THE LAW MARKET (2009). 
3 For just a small sample, see, e.g., “Standoff Continues Between Dewey Retirees, Bankruptcy 
Estate”, The American Lawyer, Oct. 11, 2012; “Dewey Defied Law of the Jungle”, Wall Street Jour-
nal, Oct. 14th 2012; “Dewey Partner Plan: A New Remedy for Law Firm Bankruptcies?”, Wall Street 
Journal blog, Oct. 15th, 2012. 
4 See, “An Existential Crisis for Law Schools”, The New York Times, July 24th, 2012. 
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who has written two books on the legal profession, 
makes the case that the profession is doomed: 
 
There are now far more capable lawyers 
and law firms than there is work for them 
to do. The financial costs of legal services 
have gotten so high that most clients are 
determined to reduce them. Many legal 
services have become commodities that 
can be supplied by a large number of 
firms with sufficient quality to meet the 
needs of most clients in most situations, 
and corporate general counsel now know 
that they can get what they need at a low-
er cost if they force the major firms to 
compete for the work.5 
 
When asked whether he’d recommend his grandchil-
dren to become lawyers, his answer was a categorical 
“no.” This was based on his view that the chance of 
making it to the top of the industry is low, and adding, 
“much of the work that’s done [to try to get there] is not 
challenging or interesting work.”6 
Ribstein’s work is also pessimistic at its core. In 
the piece most relevant to our short essay, The Death of 
Big Law, he applied economic insights to the current 
law-firm business model, and found it untenable in the 
face of various fundamental market pressures. These 
included the move away from partnerships and toward 
limited liability, globalization, and the growing role for 
in-house counsel. Looking past the short-term prob-
lems big law firms were experiencing during the Finan-
cial Crisis, he persuasively set out a vision for law firm 
work as involving greater investment in innovation, de-
ploying new technologies, and offering new services 
                                                 
5 http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/25/dewey-leboeuf-crisis-mirrors-the-legal-industrys-
woes/ 
6 Id. 
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under different organizational structures. The world 
Ribstein imagines is one in which the current law firm 
crisis forces legal professionals to play new roles, and 
then he describes how deregulation of the legal indus-
try, in areas such as partnerships with non-lawyers, 
financing arrangements, and licensing, may be needed 
to achieve this end. 
 
In this essay, we come at the issue from a slightly 
different point of view. We make several arguments. 
First, we provide some data suggesting the crisis is 
much less acute than it seems. Law as a business is 
thriving, despite the seeming seismic shifts going on 
beneath the surface. While there are problems looming 
on the horizon, and undoubtedly there have been law-
yers and recent law graduates who have had their ex-
pectations dashed, it has never been more lucrative to 
be a big firm lawyer. This is in part because law firms 
have been especially nimble in the face of market pres-
sure. The transition costs – hiring and firing – are very 
low, and therefore law firms can respond to less de-
mand with higher rates. This bodes ill for competitors 
hoping to kill off big law. 
Second, insofar as there is a crisis, it is one for 
those vested in the status quo rather than future law-
yers, clients, or society. Innovation and change come to 
all industries, and what society generally cares about is 
the customer, not the producer. While industry insiders 
may have an interest in protecting this or that model of 
the profession, it isn’t at all obvious that society should 
care one way or the other. That is – unless the changes 
make the quality of law worse. The only thing clients 
(and therefore society) care about is delivery of quality 
legal services at the right cost. The changes going on in 
the industry have not yet pushed the cost curve down 
as far as it seems may be possible, and we do not know 
the impact from the variety of changes yet on the quali-
ty of law. Given the difficulty of measuring the latter, 
there is great uncertainty about doing a social cost-
4 CURRELL & HENDERSON 
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benefit analysis. We have yet to see any persuasive ar-
gument that any given change in law costs or law firm 
models will make society better or worse off, but in-
stead see just a lot of talk about how interest group X 
or Y will be impacted. This is not a very interesting 
conversation. 
Third, there are, notwithstanding these first two 
points, profound changes to the legal market as it un-
bundles into discrete segments of products and ser-
vices markets. The main forces driving this are technol-
ogy and the transparency and ease of collaboration that 
technology facilitates. 
Naturally, the technology itself creates new chal-
lenges – most obviously, there is now vastly more doc-
umentation (including potentially millions of emails) 
implicated in any given transaction or dispute.  But the 
other side of that coin is technology’s ability to facilitate 
– and, increasingly, to perform – the ordering and anal-
ysis of that documentation.  All of that work used to be 
done in the vertically integrated law firm.  Now we see 
the potential disintegration of what has to date been 
the vertically integrated law firm model. 
But firms exist for a reason, as Ronald Coase 
taught us.  They lower information costs; they reduce 
the cost of collaboration.7  For an integrated firm struc-
ture to naturally come apart, collaboration between 
firms needs to get easier.  Given the complexity of the 
data sets and information involved in legal work, this is 
no small matter.  But collaborative technologies appear 
to be in their intermediate stages – the move to “web 
2.0” gives us a glimpse of what is possible.  If the un-
named masses can crowdsource the world’s largest 
(and possibly most accurate) encyclopedia, it seems 
likely that an ecosystem of five or ten unrelated firms 
could crowdsource a complex transactional representa-
tion. 
                                                 
7 Coase, Ronald, "The Nature of the Firm", Economica (Blackwell Publishing) 4 (16): 386–405 
(1937). 
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Building an ecosystem of this kind can only hap-
pen, however, if there is a fair bit of transparency into 
the marketplace, and visibility into the work being per-
formed within the ecosystem of firms.  Technology has 
advanced the state of this visibility – even simple devel-
opments like LinkedIn and other social networks pro-
vide vastly better information about who the players are 
within any industry, how their work is structured, and 
what they might be good for.  It’s easier to build a team 
when you can evaluate all of the players. 
As to visibility into work being performed – this is 
hard to do even in a traditional law firm.  Which law-
yers are pushing a project along? Which are shirking?  
It’s easier to know if they work just down the hallway; 
harder to know if they are in the Los Angeles office and 
you are in New York.  But new technologies allow con-
tributors to see the progress of their collaborators in 
real time, following work as it progresses and constant-
ly re-assessing next steps.   
With the advent of these collaborative technolo-
gies, a firm structure could become irrelevant.  Would 
two Wikipedia authors create better work from adjacent 
offices?  Some legal services firms have made great pro-
gress in this area, stitching together very effective glob-
al teams within and across firm boundaries.8  This abil-
ity – if it continues – could allow “virtual firms” to suc-
ceed by connecting professionals with very different 
skills to work on common projects.  Like any collabora-
tive enterprise, rules of engagement would be im-
portant, but durable commitments to the other players 
might not be. 
Fourth, in light of this long-term change in in-
dustry structure, the crucial question facing the legal 
industry is whether lawyers will still be in the driver’s 
seat when it comes to directing the course of complex 
client representations.  For years, lawyers have not only 
                                                 
8 Perhaps the best example – though surely not the only one – comes from a firm called 
NovusLaw.  See http://www.novuslaw.com/Process-NovusC3.aspx. 
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been in the driver’s seat; they have in fact performed 
and been paid for nearly all the services.  Now, lawyers 
are a sort of prime contractor sitting atop a system of 
service providers who work at their direction.  But it 
wouldn’t have to be this way, particularly as the rela-
tive economic power of the different players shifts.  To 
be specific, it could turn out that the parties earning 
the most in a representation become the most powerful 
players in crafting its strategy, and that those parties 
are not lawyers in the traditional sense. 
If this suggestion sounds awfully unlikely, think 
of the architect’s role in the production of a skyscraper.  
To be sure, architects and engineers occupy a respect-
ed position in the network of people and firms that 
make a skyscraper happen.  But they earn nowhere 
near the majority of the money being paid out, nor do 
they control most of the resources involved.  They are 
not in the driver’s seat. 
It wouldn’t necessarily have to be this way.  One 
can easily imagine a world in which the architect sits 
atop every project, calling the shots on how his vision is 
to be executed.  Because this didn’t happen, architects’ 
services have been commoditized and, to be frank, they 
don’t make much money in the scheme of things.  The 
real money flows through and to the general contractor 
and the developer. 
The question for lawyers is whether they should 
stay in the driver’s seat, managing representations 
where fulfillment is run through many different parties, 
or if they will increasingly become a commoditized sub-
contractor of specialty services like most architects. 
Lawyers surely occupy a strong position today and 
could stay in the driver’s seat on even the most compli-
cated representations.  But to do the work effectively, 
lawyers will need to develop procurement, project man-
agement and other skills not native to their planet. 
Finally, we discuss briefly the implication of the 
lawyer as prime contractor on the education, licensing, 
and regulation of lawyers. The ability of lawyers to 
2012] LAWYERS IN THE DRIVER’S SEAT? 7 
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avoid the fate of other commoditized professionals is 
dependent on how lawyers approach the content of 
their education, the design of their licensure system, 
and the regulation of their industry. For society, what 
matters is an appreciation that ultimately this is irrele-
vant, unless a case can be made that the outcome 
meaningfully changes the quality or quantity of law at 
any given cost. It is important when considering the 
changes, however, to note that the people making the 
rules that will influence where lawyering is headed are 
lawyers, and therefore may not have the broader social 
interest in mind when writing the new regulations. 
 
II. THE RESILIENCE OF BIG LAW 
 
Most of the recent analysis of the changes im-
pacting the legal sector is based on a perception that 
law firms are in trouble. In The Death of Big Law, Rib-
stein admirably tries to look past the recent Financial 
Crisis and its impact on law firm hiring to deeper 
trends in the industry, but he nevertheless uses the 
collapse of firms like Coudert Brothers and Brobeck, 
Phleger & Harrison to illustrate the fragility of the in-
dustry.9 Ribstein identifies seven factors he believes 
threaten the survival of the traditional law firm model: 
(1) “the rise of in-house counsel”; (2) “reduced size and 
scale advantage”; (3) “increasing partner-associate rati-
os”; (4) “changing clientele”; (5) “limited liability”; (6) 
“increasing global competition”; and (7) “deprofessional-
ization of law practice.”10 While we agree that these fac-
tors (and more) are all relevant to the future of the legal 
sector, it is not at all clear from the data that law firms 
are in the immediate danger that Ribstein suggests.  
Notwithstanding the fact that there was a recent 
downturn in hiring of law school graduates and many 
firms have closed or laid off lawyers, in many ways, 
                                                 
9 Ribstein, Death of Big Law, supra note 2 at 771-773. 
10 Id at 760-770. 
8 CURRELL & HENDERSON 
  
DRAFT JANUARY 16, 2013 
these are the best times ever to be a big firm lawyer. To 
be sure, it looks possible the legal sector is about to go 
through some very serious and painful changes. But 
the data do not support a claim that the recession has 
been particularly hard on lawyers. The most honest 
starting point for any analysis of the future of the legal 
profession is a recognition that law firms are doing 
very, very well and have been for the past decade. 
It is commonplace to say that the current law 
firm model is unsustainable. But this just begs the 
question: unsustainable for whom? The big law model 
in widespread use today has been sustained for dec-
ades, and remains capable of producing millions of dol-
lars in profits per partner even during economic hard 
times. The profits produced in the last decade exceed 
those that would have been hoped for in the 1990’s, 
another prosperous time for lawyers. For instance, Fig-
ure 111 shows that the prices for services from big law 
outpaced other producer prices, white and blue collar 
wages, and GDP growth over the past decade, including 
during two significant recessions. 
 
  
                                                 
11 All data is drawn from the 2012 Real Rate Report, a collaboration of CEB and TyMetrix.  The 
law firm rate data is drawn from a database of several billion dollars of legal fees actually paid to law 
firms, and is not a reflection of the law firms’ claimed rates or “rack rates”, which are discounted for 
most clients.  The report’s full analysis is reserved for a group of private clients, but for an overview 
of the report, see: http://www.executiveboard.com/exbd/legal-risk-compliance/real-rate-
report/index.page.   
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Figure 1: Selected US Price Indices 
All price indices indexed to their 2001 level = 100 
 
 
 
Ultimately, pricing is determined by supply and de-
mand – particularly in a transparent market like this 
one – and supply and demand have been very kind to 
law firm owners lately, despite the major disruptions 
and changes in the rest of the economy.  
There is no doubt that many participants in the 
legal sector have suffered significant pain. As Ribstein 
notes, many firms have failed. In addition, many recent 
graduates had difficulty finding jobs, especially at the 
height of the Financial Crisis. True, many law firm 
owners have become former law firm owners – down-
sized, forced out, or otherwise removed.  But, not to be 
flip, that’s business. In every other industry, Schum-
peterian “creative destruction” is commonplace, and a 
sector’s success or failure is usually assessed by how it 
performs for its customers and its owners. As Figure 1 
above suggestions, big law firm owners have done aw-
fully well for themselves in the last decade or so. Law 
firms are very successful businesses, and they have 
10 CURRELL & HENDERSON 
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remained so through the recession. The data below in 
Figure 2 show this more clearly: 
 
Figure 2 - Lawyers’ Average Rates Through the Recession and 
Recovery 
 
 
Lawyers’ rates continued to climb while other economic 
indicators were very weak.   
Although rates have increased, it is true that cli-
ents have bought less of their services.  In 2009, com-
panies reduced the amount they paid to law firms for 
the first time in a decade or more, as shown in Figure 
3: 
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Figure 3 – Survey of 110 In-House Lawyers 
“Compared to 2008, our spending on outside counsel in 2009 . . .” 
 
 
 
 
But nevertheless, by quickly adjusting the supply of 
hours, law firms continued to grow their rates and in 
many cases increase their profits per partner and over-
all earnings.  Revenue per lawyer shrank among Am-
Law 100 firms only in 2008 and 2009, growing again in 
2010 and 2011.  By laying off lawyers and staff and 
otherwise controlling costs, most firms were able to 
stay very profitable in 2008 and 2009, and some firms 
had record earnings in those years. 
 Since then, the top 100 American firms have 
been growing and profitable – as measured by revenue 
per lawyer, profits per partner, salaries, and now even 
by headcount.12  Law firms are growing again even as 
employment measures across the economy remain 
stagnant. 
In this way, law firms are enviable businesses (at 
least for the owners), since they have the ability to 
shrink supply very quickly in response to reductions in 
demand.  They can do this by laying off lawyers and 
staff – and frankly, they can shrink supply by working 
less and charging the same or more per hour for con-
strained output. In this way, the sticky wage problem 
or the sticky supply problem that plagues many busi-
                                                 
12 “The AmLaw 100 2011”, The American Lawyer, May 1st 2011, available online at 
http://www.americanlawyer.com/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202550268433.   
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nesses may be easier for law firms to handle. Either 
way, supply and demand still explains what’s going on, 
and so far the story hardly suggests an existential cri-
sis for big law. 
But the increasing demand for legal services has 
not been distributed as equally across firms as we have 
seen in the past. As shown on Figure 4 below, the bill-
ing rates for top performing lawyers have grown at 
dramatically faster rates than for lower performing law-
yers. This could simply be a version of what economists 
call the “superstar effect.”13 If the costs of purchasing 
the best of a particular product or service fall over time, 
then consumers have less incentive to purchase the 
second best. One way in which costs for superstars 
may fall is if information technology or other changes in 
the cost of production make it easier for superstars to 
offer their services across a larger asset base. For in-
stance, as the costs of listening to opera singers falls 
over time (starting with concerts-only, then limited ac-
cess to records, and now to immediate online access to 
any singer), then the superstar effect predicts greater 
and greater returns to the top opera singers, and lower 
returns to their competitors. 
 
  
                                                 
13 Rosen, S. 1981. “The Economics of Superstars.” American Economic Review, 71(5): 845-
858. 
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Figure 4 – Higher-Billing Versus Lower-Billing Lawyers 
 
 
 
This is not necessarily a bad thing from a social 
welfare perspective. After all, we care about welfare 
gains to customers, as well as any welfare losses, as 
best we can calculate them, to lawyers who are less 
than superstars. We cannot know the optimal tradeoff 
here, and therefore it is difficult to condemn the trend 
shown in Figure 4. What society cares about is the 
quality of law at a particular price. And from just this 
data we cannot make definitive conclusions. It could be 
that the gains to customers from superstar lawyers 
outweigh the transition costs for the non-superstar 
lawyers. Or perhaps the structural changes to costs 
means that better lawyers (or even new legal services) 
will be more broadly available at lower cost than they 
would have been without a powerful superstar effect.  
Critics, including Ribstein, believe the large firm 
model is doomed in part because the glue that holds 
partners together is weakening. Ribstein notes that the 
move to limited liability organizations means that part-
ners have a lower incentive to monitor their colleagues. 
In addition, technology reduces switching costs for law-
yers, and the superstars may use their power to lever-
age greater rents from competing firms.  
14 CURRELL & HENDERSON 
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The model for driving profitability in recent years 
has been to bring as many lawyers as possible onto a 
steady, big and elite platform of services, and to tie 
their billing rates to the overall rate scheme, as Bill 
Henderson’s article in this volume discusses.  In this 
sense, the economic rationale for big law is to act as a 
mechanism for tying the services of non-elite lawyers to 
those of elite lawyers, increasing the profit power of the 
elites.  In other words, hourly pricing rarely reflects the 
value of the person billing out his or her time; it reflects 
the market’s willingness to pay for the overall bundle of 
hours offered by the team working on any given matter. 
This is easiest to see in city-to-city transfers of 
young associates.  A fourth-year Big Law associate who 
moves from Madison to Washington, D.C. may as much 
as double her billing rate – but the move did not make 
her a better lawyer.  Her rate doubles because her ser-
vices are now tied to the services of more scarce and 
sought-after professionals with a distinctive knowledge 
set.  If she moves back to Madison in two years, having 
gained two years of knowledge and experience in Wash-
ington, her billing rate is still going to be slashed by 
50% or more.  Her rate is not about her; it’s about the 
people she is bundled with. 
By the same token, the most sought-after part-
ners are generally underpriced.  In-house counsel will 
essentially admit this by noting how difficult it is to get 
their time – and that, when you can get their full atten-
tion, $1100 an hour is more than worth it.  But as cli-
ents regularly experience, partner prices are essentially 
teaser rates that pull clients in, only for work to be per-
formed by other partners and associates who bill at 
rates elevated by their association with the marquee 
partner.  The fact is, that partner is not really available 
for very many hours to any given client; even at $1100 
an hour, the market has more than cleared. 
This leads to the inference that partners’ “natu-
ral” rate – what they would charge if they were truly so-
lo practitioners with no ability to bundle their services – 
2012] LAWYERS IN THE DRIVER’S SEAT? 15 
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is probably much higher than the $1000 or so we see 
in America right now.  This inference is supported by 
the one example that occurs in nature where truly elite 
lawyers must earn money exclusively from the sweat of 
their own brow: UK barristers.  Because barristers are 
not allowed to affiliate with other lawyers in the way 
American lawyers do, they truly make their money only 
by billing their own time.  Top barristers in London 
were billing at £1,000 ten years ago; current rates are 
higher.  Having said that, top barristers don’t appear to 
ultimately make as much money as many American big 
law partners – the pyramid model still delivers more 
profit. 
Of course, it doesn’t matter if the firm is a pyra-
mid, a tower, or an hourglass.  Where pricing is bun-
dled, prices are only sensible when seen in the context 
of the bundle of tied services.  Professionals that no-
body has ever heard of (and may never meet) are tied to 
the services of superstar lawyers, and the effect is to 
raise the rates of every lawyer in their orbit.  This way, 
the whole firm becomes more profitable and even the 
associates can be paid well. Some evidence for this 
model, which any lawyer understands intuitively as the 
current market model for big law, is presented in Fig-
ure 5 below. 
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Figure 5 – Average Hourly Rates by Law Firm Size, 2009 - 
2011 
 
 
 
Although Ribstein and others may be correct that 
there will be an increasing number of big law firm 
flameouts, to this point the evidence is just anecdotal. 
At least for now, as Figure 5 shows, big firms continued 
to have more pricing power than small firms even in the 
wake of the financial crisis.  And prices are very defi-
nitely still going up. 
We do not want to sound blasé or overly optimis-
tic, but the current law firm model, despite some recent 
evidence of weakness, seems to be thriving. Like any 
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system, it is not indefinitely sustainable, because forces 
beyond the power of any individual lawyers will cause 
change.  The reason we are all writing about this now is 
that there are good reasons to believe that the forces 
arrayed against the large law firm model are starting to 
act visibly in the sector.  One small leading indicator – 
the ability of law firms to bill their least skilled people 
as part of the “platform” of services – appears to be de-
clining, as shown on Figure 6: 
 
Figure 6 – Entry-Level Associate Hours Billed as a Percentage 
of Total Lawyer Hours Billed per Client 
 
  
 
So while firms kept and even extended some aspects 
of their pricing power, they have lost some of their abil-
ity to force the full pricing structure onto clients.  Put 
another way, clients are forcing firms to disaggregate 
their services and sell them more a la carte than in the 
past.  Clients still pay a premium for what they pur-
chase, but they no longer have to buy everything from 
one firm; they are unbundling the legal services suite.   
As we discuss in the next part, we are seeing more 
experimentation with alternatives to the billable hour, 
legal process outsourcing, and other alternatives to the 
traditional model. All of this is facilitated by the ability 
to unbundle legal services.  Even so, Big Law remains 
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economically healthy; the death of big law that Ribstein 
proclaimed may happen, but for now its vital signs are 
strong. 
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III. THE FUTURE LEGAL SECTOR 
Ribstein (and others) chart a fairly radical future 
for law firms and the legal sector. Before we offer our 
particular point of view on the future, we pause to note 
that the evidence suggests the change is more likely to 
be evolution rather than revolution. For instance, there 
are many startup firms offering legal process outsourc-
ing (LPO), but in-house legal departments are adopting 
these services at an extremely slow rate. Perhaps this is 
because law is inherently a conservative field, but 
whatever the reason, companies (that is, clients) have 
been very slow to move. While legal process outsourc-
ing has existed for well over a decade now – specialist 
e-discovery firms, contract administrators, and more – 
it is still true that even among public companies with 
in-house legal staff, uptake on these services is quite 
limited.  It is still frankly easier to turn to a law firm for 
one-stop shopping, and the law firm incentive, at least 
so far, is to keep the work largely in-house.  This is il-
lustrated below in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7 – Percentage of In-House Departments That Have Ev-
er Used Legal Process Outsourcing Providers for At Least One 
Task, 2012 
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As this illustrates, over half of the 89 corporate 
counsel surveyed in early 2012 indicated that they had 
never used any LPO for any reason.  Our experience 
suggests that these are probably the smaller depart-
ments in the response group – they simply don’t want 
to incur the coordination and oversight costs of manag-
ing a network of providers. 
So, the potential savings are significant, but up-
take of LPO services is limited.  Fewer than 10% of 
counsel in this survey suggest that their companies 
“regularly” used an LPO for discovery tasks, even 
though discovery often accounts for the lion’s share of 
legal fees in much American litigation.  This response 
group was limited only to companies with at least 200 
pieces of litigation ongoing during 2011 – so the LPO 
option was a real one, and in most cases it wasn’t tak-
en.  One-stop shopping (hire a law firm, let them han-
dle it) is still very attractive. 
Ribstein’s point that companies may grow their 
legal departments to insource some legal work and pull 
it away from law firms is right in principle – the num-
bers suggest that companies could save substantial 
money that way.  But companies don’t tend to.  CFOs 
prefer to keep headcount low even if it means spending 
more on outside vendors like law firms.   
The data in Figure 7 are a reflection of this: com-
panies could make better use of LPOs, move towards 
unbundling the law firm service, and save money over-
all if they had more in-house staff.  In other words, in-
house staff don’t just facilitate doing more work inside 
the company; they facilitate doing work outside the 
company much more efficiently by ensuring that the 
best provider is doing the work, and that won’t always 
be a law firm. 
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But companies don’t often staff this way, even 
though the potential savings are clear.  Firms these 
days like to stick to their competencies, and those 
competencies rarely include the management of law 
firms and LPOs.  They prefer to let someone else do the 
driving, and to date, this has always been law firms.  
As LPOs grow in size and capability, law firms won’t 
necessarily be doing the driving forever. 
Perhaps the slowness of even large clients in reg-
ularly using LPO services is just a version of Amara’s 
Law: We tend to overestimate the effect of a technology 
in the short run and underestimate the effect in the 
long run. In other words, Ribstein’s prediction of the 
death of big law is perhaps a decade too soon, but it 
could also be too modest if we project further forward. 
Whether technology will have the same impact on law 
that it has on other fields remains an open question, 
especially since lawyers are largely responsible for mak-
ing the laws and rules that determine the fate of their 
industry. While perhaps futile in the long run, this 
power might forestall change for longer than possible in 
other industries. Law may therefore conform to Amara’s 
Law, but with a slightly different shape of change over 
time than the internal combustion engine or speech 
synthesis. 
With these preliminaries said, where do we ex-
pect the legal sector to move, sooner or later? We offer 
three relatively preliminary and somewhat ordinary ob-
servations.  
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The first big change we see coming is that prod-
ucts and services will continue their century-old migra-
tion away from one another – that is, a legal product 
(information) will be more easily separable from a legal 
service, such as analysis of a factual situation. Analysis 
will even become a product in some cases. This kind of 
disaggregation has happened in countless other indus-
tries. New companies (and in response, incumbent 
ones) have used technology, such as information tech-
nology, computers, organizational innovation, and pro-
cess design, to disrupt prevailing methods of doing 
business by offering completely new suites of products 
and services. For example, Google took an activity as 
old as society—sifting through information, organizing 
it, prioritizing, and storing it—and turned it into a 
product. The new product – “search” enabled by a new 
technology, called a “search engine” – quickly became a 
commodity, although one that Google could profit from 
because of its enormous volume and the fact that it 
was slightly better than the next best alternative. 
Google is the superstar of search, and it uses its global 
reach to achieve enormous volumes of use, thus ensur-
ing profit at even low margins.  
Just as Google “productized” what would previ-
ously have been a service, some legal services are be-
coming commoditized and productized. The review of 
documents, the management of cases, the research of a 
legal issue, the design and application of basic legal 
documents, and other simple lawyer tasks are all now 
discrete industries in which many new startups are of-
fering technology-based solutions to clients. These ser-
vices were once bundled into the law firm platform – 
but now it remains to be seen if they stay bundled. 
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There are arguments for it remaining so, as a de-
scriptive matter. Chief among these are the regulatory 
barriers Ribstein describes in The Death of Big Law. 
The current rules banning law firms from having non-
lawyer partners, coupled with professional licensure 
and rules banning the unlawful practice of “law,” de-
fined very broadly, are significant impediments to inno-
vation in the legal sector. Since lawyers preferring the 
status quo currently outnumber lawyers trying to upset 
it, and the latter is also not a more powerful interest 
group (yet), there is reason to believe these rules will 
persist for a while.  
The key to changing the political calculation is to 
make the case that the lawyers (and others) opposing 
the status quo arrangements regarding lawyers are in-
terested in improving the quality of law or the price of 
law for a given quality. The argument can be a tough 
one to make. Increasing access to lawyers, which lower-
ing prices would presumably do, is not clearly a good 
thing. For it to be so, one would have to believe that 
lawyers and legal processes add social value beyond 
their social cost, which is not at all obvious. For in-
stance, if one believes that litigation effectively and effi-
ciently deters accidents, say by improving product de-
sign or disclosure about products, but that the optimal 
point of deterrence has not yet been reached, then low-
ering legal costs might work a social welfare improve-
ment. But, on the other hand, if one believes the mar-
ginal benefit of lawyers is zero (because we are at the 
efficient point) or negative (because lawyers serve their 
own interests or impose costs that exceed the benefits), 
then lowering legal costs would be a bad thing. 
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There are numerous areas of law beyond litiga-
tion, however, and in these the case may be easier to 
make. In most transactions, lawyers serve the role of 
trying to increase the size of the total pie (or “surplus,” 
as economists would say), as well as helping to divide it 
in the interests of their clients. It is in this transaction-
al world where technological improvements can be of 
most obvious value, and therefore for regulatory barri-
ers to be most sensibly removed. For instance, if every-
one would be better off if everyone made wills, then 
lowering the costs of will making (at a given quality) 
would be a social improvement.  
Or take a more complex example: mergers and 
acquisitions. Many academics and corporate observers 
believe the quality of corporate management (and there-
fore the quality of corporations) depends heavily on the 
discipline provided by a robust takeover market, what 
is called “the market for corporate control.” Let manag-
ers know that they could be ousted after a takeover, 
and they will behave. A significant cost for any merger 
is the due diligence and approval process, which in-
volves the review (by lawyers and others) of thousands 
of documents for both content and privilege. This pro-
cess was once done by hand (with armies of contract 
lawyers) but is now increasingly done by technology. As 
the costs of diligence and approval fall, and undoubted-
ly new legal technologies can make them fall dramati-
cally, then this lowers the total costs (that is, the sum 
of decision costs and error costs) of takeovers. This 
means more deals can be done at a given price, which 
increases the disciplining power of the market for cor-
porate control.  
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On the other side, however, is the fact that all 
mergers today result in multiple lawsuits designed to 
frustrate their completion or get the best deal for 
shareholders, depending on one’s point of view. Given 
this ambiguity, and the fact that cost reductions may 
make litigation cheaper as well, the net effect on social 
welfare may be zero or even negative. If more deals can 
get done but more lawsuits that simply transfer wealth 
to lawyers or impose costs on defendants are possible, 
then the benefits may be canceled out. Since the tech-
nology may work equally well for both transactions and 
litigation, the result is uncertain. Of course, if the qual-
ity of outcomes can be improved or law works faster (for 
a given quality of outcome), then the technology may be 
a social benefit. But these are large open questions that 
may be determined by one’s prior beliefs about the val-
ue of lawyers in the first place. As such, it is hard to 
definitively see how the political calculation for reform 
plays out.  
The second big change we see happening is that 
process efficiency will, as in so many industries, be the 
most sustainable competitive advantage for new legal 
technologies/firms.  Cost arbitrage (locating in North 
Dakota or Gurgaon) can easily be replicated; new tech-
nology can be quickly shared or copied. But process 
advances are often extremely difficult to replicate, even 
when the code is known. Consider Wal-mart. The effi-
ciency gains from the Wal-mart operations and logistics 
process accounted for an enormous amount of the total 
US productivity gain of the 1990s and 2000s. Few 
companies have been able to come close to matching 
Walmart’s efficiency, even though they have tried to de-
ploy similar process changes.  
Another classic example involves the “lean” man-
ufacturing process deployed by Toyota. Lean manufac-
turing is an organizational, informational, and manu-
facturing process that is relatively simple. For instance, 
individual workers on an assembly line are empowered 
to make suggestions for work improvements, often us-
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ing notes placed in cubbyholes, or to innovate on their 
own initiative. Toyota and other Japanese auto manu-
facturers deployed these processes during the 1980s to 
gain enormous improvements in quality. Their “secrets” 
were set forth in great detail in the 1991 book The Ma-
chine that Changed the World,14 and yet American auto 
makers were unable to replicate the results. It seems a 
firm cannot just decide to “go lean” on a complex pro-
cess.  
Legal representation (particularly for large mat-
ters) is a complex process, and it is far from likely that 
lawyers working within traditional law firms have the 
wherewithal to transform their operations – to “go 
lean.” This opens the door for specialty firms who have 
deep competencies in a single process and its related 
technologies.  A good example is NovusLaw, which spe-
cializes in document management, to develop process 
improvements outside of law firms as a separate ser-
vice. NovusLaw has created processes and developed 
technologies and quality control programs to lower the 
costs of document review, management and analysis 
services. This type of specialization in process is some-
thing that law firms are unlikely to be good at – it is ex-
ceptionally hard to stretch a firm into a new industry, 
which is essentially what this shift in focus would do.  
Instead, we expect to see firms that are good at reform-
ing complex processes to beat up law firms in this 
space extensively.  Indeed, NovusLaw and many other 
LPOs were founded by non-lawyers with prior experi-
ence in business process outsourcing. 
The third big change we see happening is that 
some entity will serve as a “prime contractor” for selec-
tion, coordination, management, and liability for these 
new technologies. The prime contractor is in the driv-
er’s seat - making choices about resource allocation, 
and sitting atop the economic food chain.   
                                                 
14 The Machine that Changed the World: The Story of Lean Production, James P. Womack, 
Daniel T. Jones & Daniel Roos (1991). 
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In some fields, it seems as if the original profes-
sional has been able to serve in this new role. Medicine 
may be an example of this. Over the past few decades, 
a variety of new market participants have entered the 
medical area to offer new products and services. The 
rise of the nurse practitioner, the physician’s assistant, 
massage therapists, physical and occupational thera-
pists, nutritionists, MRI providers and a host of other 
medical technologists is a good example of this phe-
nomenon. So too may be the development of new tech-
nologies that do the things that doctors used to do. But 
the doctor is generally still the primary gatekeeper be-
tween patients and these service providers or technolo-
gies. Based on licensure or reputation or perceived ex-
pertise, doctors have been able to capture much of the 
value of these new services. Doctors (or maybe hospi-
tals) are (still, it seems) the quarterbacks of the medical 
sector: they call the plays.  Unlike prime contractors, 
they may not profit directly from the services provided 
within the broader network of providers.  But their po-
sition at the top of the network ensures that they will 
continue to do very well. 
On the other hand, as noted above, architects 
seem to have ceded this central role to others. Other 
professionals, like developers and contractors, were 
able to take over the prime contractor role that could 
have been served by architects. The same might be said 
about big box or catalog retailers, like Sears. New en-
trants, like Amazon, deployed new technologies and 
processes, all of which were easily replicable in some 
sense, to overtake incumbents who held all the natural 
advantages in brand, customer loyalty, information 
networks, and so on. To be sure, Sears and K-Mart 
were just firms and not professions with the ability to 
use licensing to secure their advantage, but it remains 
to be seen how powerful this difference is. It did not 
seem to have worked for architects, although perhaps it 
has for doctors so far.  
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The result of all this is a market characterized by 
a series of providers that are coordinated by a prime 
contractor. The question for the legal industry is: who 
will the prime contractor be? Will law firms be able to 
play a significant role in the deployment of these new 
technologies or will they be marginalized? This is the 
question we take on in the next part. But it is im-
portant to reiterate that the question for customers, the 
economy, and the nation is: will the result serve us 
well?  Whether lawyers are able to maintain their privi-
leged position is utterly irrelevant from an efficiency or 
social welfare point of view. 
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IV. CAN LAWYERS STAY IN THE DRIVER’S SEAT? 
 
So far we’ve argued that the market for legal ser-
vices is surprisingly stable even in the face of big 
changes.  We’ve also noted that big law firms are sur-
prisingly robust in the midst of what seems to be a rap-
idly changing market. We’ve argued that the biggest 
likely change for lawyers is in the process of law, specif-
ically the management of documents, as well as the 
commoditization of routine legal analysis and services.  
These developments are all part of the unbundling of 
the legal services suite.  If the market fragments in this 
way, major representations will involve the services of 
multiple specialty providers instead of being housed in 
a single law firm.  Among those many firms, who will be 
in the driver’s seat? 
There are several possibilities, which we only 
sketch briefly here. Clients could still go to a single law 
firm, which would then coordinate all of the activities of 
various service providers, whether they provide docu-
ment review technology, legal research, analysis, or an-
other function. One could say that this is the current 
default – clients go to a law firm, and the firm coordi-
nates other service providers to the extent there are 
any.  Historically this has at least included photocopy-
ing, court reporters, and other relatively low value-
added services.  In the last decade this has evolved to 
include things like legal research, document analysis 
and management, and other higher value-added work.  
But law firms still have little incentive to outsource 
those services under the prevailing model, meaning 
that LPOs are still used fairly infrequently. 
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Businesses with large or sophisticated in-house 
legal departments could coordinate their own legal mat-
ters – stitching together a network of LPOs, law firms 
and individual lawyers to serve their needs.  This al-
ready happens in some cases, but it’s still quite rare.  
With the exception of major financial services, pharma-
ceutical, energy and defense companies, in-house de-
partments are very thinly staffed.  Most in-house coun-
sel spend very little of their time managing law firms, 
yet they know that this is a very important task that 
too often gets ignored. 
As the legal market wakes up, gaps are starting 
to be filled by entrepreneurs.  On the matter of helping 
corporate counsel to find and manage law firms, a re-
cent example is a small company called AdvanceLaw.15  
AdvanceLaw helps companies that already have large 
legal departments to find and retain lawyers in mid-tier 
cities (e.g., Minneapolis or Sacramento) who can do the 
work of a Chicago or Los Angeles law firm more effi-
ciently.   
What’s remarkable is that this service is needed 
at all.  Does the general counsel of a Fortune 500 com-
pany really need help finding counsel in Minneapolis 
just so she can do the obvious thing and send her se-
curities work there at half the cost of a Chicago firm?  
Because of high search costs, the difficulty and cost of 
oversight, and frankly the fact that in-house counsel 
are spread thinly across dozens of different activities, 
the answer is yes.  This is an important observation, 
because it runs contrary to the general assumption in 
the legal market that clients will select and manage 
their own law firms – as though that were a fairly sim-
ple task. 
                                                 
15 See www.advancelaw.com.  
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Put another way, management really is work, and 
it’s hard work.  The tasks of identification, selection, 
quality control and oversight of firms – those tasks are 
difficult and time consuming.  And the proof is in the 
pudding: for many years, they have been hard enough 
to deter even relatively sophisticated clients from at-
tempting to switch from their incumbent law firms to a 
new provider.  The switching costs are high.  Firms like 
AdvanceLaw exist to carry the burden of selection and 
oversight, and they are making good money to date be-
cause there is demand to shift work away from incum-
bent law firms in major cities towards smaller, cheaper 
firms in mid-sized markets. 
 
We are hesitant to draw any firm or long-term 
conclusions at this point, but we offer some perspec-
tives informed by our interactions with the various par-
ticipants in the market. 
It is very unlikely that, at least in the medium 
term, the prime contractor for legal services will be the 
client. In-house legal departments have not been built 
this way or shown the wherewithal to run legal matters 
in detail. Although seemingly very well positioned to 
serve as coordinator, in-house departments are cur-
rently more like Sears than they are Amazon. Their 
principal competency is inward-facing: they know their 
company better than any outside lawyer ever could, but 
they are weaker in facing outward to the market. LPOs 
have existed for more than a decade, and it is exceed-
ingly rare for an in-house staff to coordinate external 
providers in a meaningful way.16 
                                                 
16 To anticipate an objection: yes, there are rare instances of large in-house departments actively 
managing a slew of vendors.  These examples are well-known because of the massive size and reputa-
tion of the departments involved – e.g., DuPont (in fact, see: www.dupontlegalmodel.com).  But if 
there are about 5,000 companies listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ, perhaps 20-30 companies do 
something like this, and the rest do nothing of the sort.  A more accurate picture of the market is this: 
most public companies do not have a single in-house lawyer.  Of those who do, most have one or two 
lawyers total.  A few hundred at the top of the market have a “legal department”.  Needless to say, 
most private companies have no in-house counsel at all. 
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In any event, there will never be a surfeit of in-
house counsel.  General counsel usually want more 
staff, and CFOs are allergic to headcount.  The disa-
greement reliably ends there – in-house lawyers are 
added very slowly and only after needs arise. 
While new firms may be formed to coordinate law 
firms and other legal service providers, they face signif-
icant barriers. For starters, because of profit sharing 
rules in the legal sector, firms like AdvanceLaw are ex-
tremely limited in what they can do and how they can 
get paid. 
Beyond this, issues about expertise, confidential-
ity, and privilege will discourage the formation of these 
firms, as will the reluctance on the part of clients to 
add another cost layer, even if the net result seems to 
be an overall cost reduction on paper. For one reason, 
another layer means additional monitoring and other 
agency costs, which are likely to be quite significant for 
start-up firms trying to build a reputation for quality 
work. In addition, law firms, who would in this model 
serve an important subsidiary function – e.g., legal 
analysis – will likely resist sharing their client relation-
ships with other providers for fear of poaching.  
So from an expertise, trust, and regulatory (prof-
it-sharing) perspective, law firms may be able to stay in 
the driver’s seat here.  In fact, they occupy a protected 
space.  They can sit at the center of the growing field of 
specialist non-lawyers, and instructing them in their 
work, preserve the attorney-client privilege while 
providing the most value-added (and expensive, non- 
commoditized) pieces of work. 
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But there is a significant problem with this pre-
diction. Law firms, as currently constituted, are terrible 
at management, coordination, project planning and ex-
ecution, technology management and integration, and 
pretty much everything involved in stitching together 
the efforts of a diverse and unrelated collection of ven-
dors to create a coherent service for clients.  As anyone 
knows who has been through the experience, it is well-
nigh impossible to take a services firm and turn it into 
a software firm – or to go the other way.  Companies 
naturally develop around a set of competencies, and 
getting a firm to adapt to a new competency is hard.  
Adapting a firm to a whole new industry is nearly im-
possible without making that shift through acquisi-
tions. 
Law firms could choose to acquire LPOs and tuck 
them into the firm’s service offerings.  Profit sharing 
rules might make it hard for them to attract and retain 
the best talent in this part of the firm, though some 
creative entity structures could likely get around those 
concerns.  But the fact remains that lawyers would 
need to develop a robust project management compe-
tency, and this is just not a part of the culture of big 
law. 
In short, law firms are well positioned to serve as 
the prime contractor, but they aren’t well positioned to 
be any good at it.  If this is to change, then there are 
several aspects of legal education, legal licensure, and 
law firm management that will have to change as well. 
We consider these issues briefly in the next part. 
 
V. FROM HERE TO THERE 
 
The big problem with law firms serving as the 
prime contractor for a suite of legal services is that the 
kind of activities involved in managing a suite of spe-
cialist vendors are not a part of law firm culture, and 
appear nowhere in lawyers’ training.  Law schools are 
currently designed to teach individuals to learn law, to 
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apply law to facts, and to offer advice in light of this le-
gal analysis. Lawyers, at least at the law school the au-
thors attended, are not taught to manage suppliers of 
legal technology. The comparative advantage of lawyers 
is the one they have as officers of the court, that is, 
knowing the law and applying the law to situations, 
business or otherwise.  For the same reasons architects 
don’t sit atop a dizzying roster of suppliers to manage 
everything to do with the construction of their build-
ings, lawyers may do poorly to sit atop a dizzying array 
of vendors to coordinate the execution of their legal 
strategies. There are important differences between 
these two examples, but the basic concern about lack 
of competency, inappropriate use of time and talents, 
and comparative advantage stands. 
Of course, law schools could change. The next 
generation of lawyers could be taught these skills, and 
there have been some minor nods in this direction. Al-
ternatively, there could effectively be two tracks within 
law schools, or perhaps within firms: those interested 
in “management” and those interested in “analysis.” 
This is done in many fields, including in academia, 
where some scholars focus entirely on ideas and schol-
arship, while others get involved in “administration.” 
The FBI uses this approach as well. All special agents 
work cases for the first several years, but then some 
are selected to become managers. This involves addi-
tional training to develop these management skills. 
From these analogs, one can imagine either law school 
providing a grounding in these skills for those interest-
ed in a future career in legal management, or firms 
providing them (as in the case of the FBI), or perhaps a 
supplementary education provided by law schools or 
business schools or some other schools for lawyers in-
terested in legal management. (Here, the model could 
be something like the current executive MBA programs, 
which teach business people management skills at the 
mid-point of their careers.) 
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In any event, the traditional pyramidal structure 
of law firms (that is, a relatively small number of part-
ners supported by a larger number of associates) may 
start to look more like a tower. As the data above in 
Figure 6 suggest, there is already pressure on the pyr-
amid model, and the law firm as prime contractor 
would decrease further the viability of this model. This 
will require law firms to rethink their business model, 
but it isn’t clear what the impact will be on profits. 
While partners traditionally made money by taking la-
bor profit from their associates, they may be able to 
achieve the same result by marking up their subcon-
tractors’ services. In competitive equilibrium, it isn’t 
clear that this will be a less profitable model. 
The larger implication for law firms will be about 
how they develop and select partners. The current 
model of hiring a hundred associates, filtering them 
through many years, and then selecting ten partners 
from that group may be unsustainable in a world in 
which a law firm serves the role of prime contractor 
and engages in only more specialized legal analysis. 
One option would be to rely on the subcontractors to 
hire lawyers to serve support functions, and then 
choose from that pool. But the skills needed in these 
two areas are likely to be vastly different, making this a 
very unlikely option. Moreover, if technology is disrup-
tive, the total number of lawyers necessary will fall, 
perhaps dramatically. (This is a big problem for the 
current model of legal education, which may produce 
too many lawyers, especially those who aspire to do the 
high-end analysis work that is likely to remain the do-
main of traditional lawyers.) 
Another option for law firms is to simply be 
choosier about the associates they hire. This will not 
only impact law schools by reducing the demand for 
lawyers, but will also put pressure on the law school 
curriculum, on the evaluation law schools do of their 
students, and perhaps increase the need for specialty 
licensure.  
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On the latter point, some work has been done, 
including by Ribstein, on the issue of specialty licen-
sure. It is, after all, somewhat odd that lawyers are 
subject to a licensing regime (the bar exam) that is 
completely different from that in other professions like 
doctors and stock brokers. For instance, the bar exam 
is a one-time test (usually taken at the end of law 
school); it is a general subject matter test taken by eve-
ry lawyer; and it has extremely high pass rates. In con-
trast, in medicine, licensure examinations take place 
over time (including while in various stages of educa-
tion and training), must be repeated with some fre-
quency in re-accreditation exams, and, in addition to a 
general test, are tailored for specific specialty subject 
matters. Neurosurgeons and pediatric oncologists both 
take the multi-stage medical boards to become “doc-
tors,” but take separate boards, including every few 
years, to certify their competence in the particular 
fields. Stockbrokers utilize a similar, if somewhat less 
rigorous, approach to licensure.  
Another version of this is the Canadian model of 
“articling,” in which a law graduate spends about a 
year as an apprentice with an approved mentor learn-
ing about the law. This would not have to be as much a 
return to the 18th Century model of legal education as it 
may sound. If law firms are going to face pressure on 
their current business model, everything that happens 
before law firms take on new associates, whether it is 
law school, extra-law school education, apprenticing, 
licensing, and so forth, will likely become much more 
important. In light of this, it is natural to see law firm 
partners starting to push law schools into doing more 
practical skills training and filtering of students. 
Whether law schools have a comparative advantage 
here either vis-à-vis law firms or third party providers 
remains to be seen, but expect the pressure to intensify 
as changes wrought by technology increasingly makes 
the law firm pyramid more unsustainable. 
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We imagine that the move toward a prime con-
tractor role for large law firms, as well as a new model 
in which legal work is allocated not to a single or select 
group of large law firms but rather a more nimble mix 
of providers, will put pressure on law schools and the 
ABA to adapt the licensure model. For example, law 
firms may demand ex ante certification of legal analysts 
in particular areas, like securities, mergers & acquisi-
tions, bankruptcy, or complex civil litigation, instead of 
using the first few years of law practice as a learning 
tool and filter for associates. If firms become more tow-
ers than pyramids, they may try to have others, mainly 
law schools and bar programs, do some of the ex ante 
filtering and teaching for them.  
In addition, the need for specialty licensure may 
be a sort of keep that is the last defense of the lawyer 
bastion. Getting specialty credentials, whether it is a 
license or a certification, may be a way for these law-
yers to forestall competitive pressures on legal analysis. 
Such pressure may even explain the development of the 
alternative models used by doctors and stockbrokers. 
Whether these pressures push back to impact law 
school curricula or increase opportunities for third par-
ties, like BarBri or the Princeton Review, to offer law 
content is beyond our scope here. But one suggestion 
seems likely to us: if the legal profession continues to 
play the troll guarding the only bridge to the practice of 
law, the market will figure out how to build other, un-
protected bridges.  After all, the “practice of law” is a 
pretty narrow concept, and a great deal of legal service 
can be rendered without resorting to it.  If the current 
regime doesn’t change, it could emerge that lawyers 
have a shrinking piece of a growing overall pie. 
And the pie will continue to grow.  There is simply 
no reason to believe that overall expenditures on law 
will shrink in the foreseeable future.  But while we be-
lieve the sector will grow, we are far less confident in 
our ability to predict how exactly that growth will take 
place, and how clients will be served under the new 
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model.  The evolution has begun, albeit slowly; it will 
definitely continue. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this essay, we’ve tried to make a few simple 
points. First, as the epigraph above suggests, times are 
not often easy to pigeonhole, and are, in any event, dif-
ferent things to different people. Along many measura-
ble dimensions, these are the best of times for large law 
firms. The returns to owners of large law firms have 
never been better, despite the country suffering 
through the worst economic crisis since the Great De-
pression. This should point to the durability of the ex-
isting large law firm model, either because of its social 
value or because of the ability of lawyers, as rule writ-
ers, to rig the game to their favor. The durability is es-
pecially remarkable because, unlike during prior peri-
ods of macro-economic distress, law firms are facing 
incredible pressure from various entrants offering to 
unbundle the typical law firm product, by offering legal 
products, like document review and management, as 
well as legal services, like simple contract preparation. 
This should give pause to those who believe, like our 
dearly departed friend Larry Ribstein, that Big Law is 
dead. 
Second, and notwithstanding the first point, 
there is abundant evidence that past is not prologue. 
The technological forces that are reshaping industries 
and creating new products and services, as well as un-
bundling existing providers of products and services, 
are as powerful in law as they are in the entertainment 
business, consumer goods business, securities busi-
ness, and so on. Ribstein rightly predicted a sea change 
for big law, albeit perhaps falling victim to Amara’s 
Law.  
Third, we imagine the net result of this change 
will be the creation of a new role, what we call the 
“prime contractor,” that involves two key features: (1) 
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carving out some protected space in which lawyers ex-
ercise their comparative advantage as legal counselors; 
and (2) profiting from the remainder of legal work by 
acting as a case facilitator/manager. The second role 
could involve choosing and monitoring suppliers, enter-
ing into joint ventures or partnerships, providing tai-
lored value added services on top of basic technological 
platforms, or even vertical integration. While we are 
certain we cannot predict what the future will look like, 
we are confident large law firms are going to want to 
play some role here.  
These leads to our fourth point, which is that to 
do so, the model for training and licensing/certifying 
lawyers is likely going to have to change, but not per-
haps in the way that the current critics suggest. Rather 
than teaching lawyers how to think more like their cli-
ents, it might be as or more important to teach lawyers 
to be better managers of other suppliers of legal prod-
ucts. Lawyers will also inevitably be involved in the de-
velopment of new technologies and legal tools, and 
there may be educational green space here as well. Our 
(very preliminary) guess is that firms will try to push 
much education and filtering out of the firm, but they 
will obviously do so only if they are saving money by 
doing so. If they “pay” for this one way or the other, 
then it may make sense to keep it in house. But if they 
can externalize the role the pyramid used to play onto 
others, for example, a government that subsidizes edu-
cation, then this should be what we expect them to do 
more of. 
Finally, all of this speculation is in a sense beside 
the point from a social welfare standpoint. A benevolent 
social planner shouldn’t give a hoot whether law is de-
livered this way or that, whether law firms serve as the 
prime contractor or even if there is one, or whether law 
schools teach things that matter or not. What matters 
to society are the quality, quantity, and price of legal 
services. These things are in turn determined by the 
rules put in place that regulate lawyers, as well as the 
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choices made by institutions like law schools, bar asso-
ciations, and law firms. What is crucial to realize is that 
these institutions will have their own selfish incentives 
in mind when crafting rules, and these may deviate 
from the social optimum. It is far from obvious that Ad-
am Smith’s confidence about butchers and bakers ob-
tains in a world in which lawyers have successfully 
used a cartel to restrict output and raise prices for 
hundreds of years. That said, we are not confident at 
this point about how the social welfare calculus cuts. 
In some sense, lower costs of law could be a good thing, 
while in other sense it could be a bad thing. As the fu-
ture of Big Law and every other kind of law unfolds, if 
our essay conveys nothing else, we hope it conveys that 
the social question should be paramount – not the 
smaller matter of whether lawyers win or lose in the 
coming industry reshuffle.  
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